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Abstract
This paper provides a tractable continuous-time CARA-Gaussian framework to explore how
the interactions of risk aversion and induced uncertainty due to informational frictions deter-
mine strategic consumption-portfolio rules, precautionary savings, and consumption dynamics
in the presence of uninsurable labor income. Specifically, after solving the model explicitly, we
explore the relative importance of the two types of induced uncertainty: (i) model uncertainty
due to robustness and (ii) state uncertainty due to limited information-processing capacity as
well as risk aversion in determining asset allocation, precautionary savings, and consumption
dynamics. Finally, we discuss how the separation between risk aversion and intertemporal
substitution affects strategic asset allocation and precautionary savings.
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1. Introduction
For most individual consumers, human wealth, the expected present value of their current and
future labor earnings, is a major fraction of their total wealth. The key difference between financial
wealth and human wealth is that the latter is a non-tradable asset because it is difficult to sell
claims against future labor income due to the moral hazard problem. Recently some studies have
examined the effects of non-tradable labor income on the optimal share of financial wealth invested
in this risky asset. For example, Heaton and Lucas (2000) studied how the presence of background
risks influences portfolio allocations. They found that labor income is the most important source
of wealth and labor income risk is weakly positively correlated with equity returns. Viceira (2001)
examined the effects of labor income risk on optimal consumption and portfolio choice for both
employed and retired investors. Chan and Viceira (2005) showed that when labor income risk is
idiosyncratic, endogenous labor supply can have significant positive effects on the share invested
in the risky asset relative to the case in which labor income is exogenous. Wang (2009) examined
optimal consumption-saving and asset allocation when consumers cannot observe their income
growth.1 These studies mainly consider two key aspects of labor income risk: the variance and
persistence of labor income and the correlation between labor income and the equity return. In the
presence of labor income, there is a income-hedging demand when the equity return is correlated
with labor income. For example, if the labor income risk is positively correlated with the shock to
the equity return, the equity is less desirable because it offers a bad hedge against negative labor
income shocks. Another important implication of non-tradable labor income is that it leads to
precautionary savings by interacting with risk aversion when it is not perfectly correlated with the
equity return.
Ordinary investors face pervasive uncertainty in the real world, and have to make optimal
consumption-saving-investment decisions in an environment where they are uncertain about the
model structure or the evolution of the key economic and financial variables (e.g., the equity re-
turns, the aggregate components in individuals’ labor income). It is therefore important for us to
understand how rational investors make optimal financial decisions when facing various types
of risks and the induced uncertainty. This paper provides a tractable continuous-time constant
absolute risk aversion (CARA)-Gaussian framework to explore how induced uncertainty due to
informational frictions, the interaction of model uncertainty due to robustness and state uncer-
tainty due to rational inattention, affects strategic asset allocation and precautionary savings in the
presence of non-tradable labor income.2 Model uncertainty and state uncertainty arise from two
major types of incomplete information: one is incomplete information about the distribution of the
state evolution equation and the other is incomplete information about the true level of the state.
Hansen and Sargent (1995) first introduced the preference for robustness (RB, a concern for model
1See Campbell and Viceira (2002) for a recent survey on this topic.
2Here we label model uncertainty or state uncertainty “induced uncertainty” because it is induced by the interactions
of the preference for robustness or information-processing constraints with fundamental uncertainty (e.g., labor income
uncertainty or uncertainty about the return on the risky asset).
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misspecification) into linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) economic models.3 In robust control prob-
lems, agents are concerned about the possibility that their true model is misspecified in a manner
that is difficult to detect statistically; consequently, they choose their decisions as if the subjective
distribution over shocks was chosen by an evil agent to minimize their utility.4 As discussed in
Hansen, Sargent, and Tallarini (HST, 1999) and Luo and Young (2010), robustness (RB) models can
produce precautionary savings even within the class of LQ models, which leads to analytical sim-
plicity.5 Sims (2003) first introduced information-processing constraint (rational inattention or RI)
into economics and argued that it is a plausible method for introducing sluggishness, randomness,
and delay into economic models. In his formulation agents have finite Shannon channel capacity,
limiting their ability to process signals about the true state. As a result, a shock to the state induces
only gradual responses by individuals, as their finite capacity requires some time to discover how
much the state has moved. Because RI introduces additional uncertainty, the endogenous noise
due to finite capacity, into economic models, RI by itself creates an additional demand for ro-
bustness. The distinction between these two types of informational frictions can be seen from the
following continuous-time transition equation of the true state (st):
dst = (Ast + Bct) dt + σdBt,
where st and ct are state and control variables, respectively, A, B, and σ are constant coefficients,
and Bt is a standard Brownian motion. Under RB, agents do not know the true data generating
process driven by the random innovation (Bt), whereas agents under RI cannot observe the true
state (st) perfectly.
As the first contribution of this paper, we construct a continuous-time theoretical framework
in which there are (i) two fundamental risks: uninsurable labor income and the equity return,
(ii) two types of induced uncertainty due to informational frictions described above: model un-
certainty (MU) due to the preference for robustness and state uncertainty (SU) due to rational
inattention, and (iii) CARA-constant intertemporal substitution. The main reason that we adopt
the CARA utility specification is that we can obtain explicit solutions in the portfolio choice model
with uninsurable labor income.6 We then show that the models with these features can be solved
explicitly. In particular, when introducing state uncertainty due to rational inattention, we de-
rive the continuous-time version of the information-processing constraint (IPC) proposed in Sims
3See Hansen and Sargent (2007) for a textbook treatment on robustness.
4The solution to a robust decision-maker’s problem is the equilibrium of a max-min game between the decision-
maker and nature.
5Luo, Nie, and Young (2012) briefly discussed the differences between CARA and RB within the discrete-time set-
ting. Although both RB and CARA preferences (i.e., Caballero 1990 and Wang 2004, 2009) increase the precautionary
savings premium via the intercept terms in the consumption functions, they have distinct implications for the marginal
propensity to consume out of permanent income (MPC). Specifically, CARA preferences do not alter the MPC relative
to the LQ case, whereas RB increases the MPC. That is, under RB, in response to a negative wealth shock, the consumer
would choose to reduce consumption more than that predicted in the CARA model (i.e., save more to protect himself
against the negative shock).
6It is well known that there is no closed-form solution if we adopt the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility
and explicitly model uninsurable labor income in the portfolio choice model in the vein of Merton (1969).
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(2003).7 In this case, we can obtain the explicit expressions for the steady state conditional vari-
ance, the variance of the optimal noise, and the Kalman gain in terms of finite capacity (κ > 0)
and fundamental uncertainty.8 This paper is therefore closely related to the literature on imperfect
information, learning, asset allocation and asset pricing. For example, Gennotte (1986), Detemple
(1986), and Wang (2009).
Second, after solving the models explicitly, we can exactly inspect the mechanism through
which these two types of informational frictions interact and determine the level of induced uncer-
tainty. Using the closed-form strategic consumption-portfolio rules in the models with the three
features described above, we can explore how the informational frictions affect different types of
demand for the risky asset (i.e., the standard speculation demand and the income-hedging de-
mand), the precautionary saving demand due to the presence of undiversified labor income, and
consumption dynamics.9 In particular, we find that CARA is more important than RB in determin-
ing optimal allocation in the risky asset and the precautionary saving demand. Furthermore, we
find that SU is more important than MU when the consumer is not highly information-constrained.
Third, when calibrating the RB parameter using the detection error probabilities (DEP, or p),
we find that RI due to finite capacity can affect the calibrated parameter value of RB. Specifically,
we find that in the presence of model uncertainty, the correlation between the equity return and
undiversified labor income not only affects the hedging demand for the risky asset, but also affects
its standard speculation demand. The key reason is that given the same value of the deep RB pa-
rameter measured by DEP, the correlation between labor income and the equity return increases
the calibrated value of RB and thus reduces the optimal share invested in the risky asset. In addi-
tion, we also examine how the separation of risk aversion and intertemporal substitution and the
stochastic properties of undiversified labor income affect the calibrated RB parameter, the optimal
share invested in the risky asset, and the precautionary saving demand.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the setup of a continuous-time consump-
tion and portfolio choice model with uninsurable labor income. Section 3 introduces RB into the
benchmark model and examines the theoretical and empirical implications of RB on consumption-
portfolio rules and precautionary savings using calibrated RB parameters. Section 4 examines the
interactions of RB and state uncertainty due to limited information-processing constraint. Section
5 discusses the role of intertemporal substitution in an extension with recursive utility. Section 6
concludes.
7In the RI literature, some studies assume ex post Gaussian distributions and Gaussian noise but adopt exponential
or CARA preferences; for example, Peng (2004), Peng and Xiong (2005), Mondria (2010), and Van Nieuwerburgh and
Veldkamp (2009, 2010).
8We also show that the RI model is equivalent to the traditional signal extraction (SE) model with exogenously
specified noises in the sense that they lead to the same model dynamics when the signal-to-noise ratio and finite capacity
satisfy some restriction. In other words, we can provide a microfoundation (limited information-processing constraint)
for the exogenously specified SNR in the traditional SE models.
9Maenhout (2004, 2006), Uppal and Wang (2002), Cao, Wang, and Zhang (2005), and Liu (2010) examined how model
uncertainty affects portfolio choices and/or asset prices.
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2. A Continuous-time Consumption-Portfolio Choice Model with Uninsurable Labor
Income
In this paper, we follow Wang (2009) and consider a continuous-time version of the Caballero-
type model (1990) with portfolio choice. The typical consumer facing uninsurable labor income
in the model economy makes optimal consumption-saving-asset allocation decisions. Specifically,
we assume that the consumer can access: one risk-free asset and one risky asset, and also re-
ceive uninsurable labor income. Labor income (yt) is assumed to follow a continuous-time AR(1)
(Ornstein-Uhlenbeck) process:
dyt = ρ
(
µ
ρ
− yt
)
dt + σydBy,t, (1)
where the unconditional mean and variance of income are y = µ/ρ and σ2y / (2ρ), respectively, the
persistence coefficient ρ governs the speed of convergence or divergence from the steady state,10
By,t is a standard Brownian motion on the real line R, and σy is the unconditional volatility of the
income change over an incremental unit of time.
The agent can invest in both a risk free asset with a constant interest rate r and a risky asset
(i.e., the market portfolio) with a risky return ret . The instantaneous return dr
e
t of the risky market
portfolio over dt is given by
dret = (r + pi) dt + σedBe,t, (2)
where pi is the market risk premium, Be,t is a standard Brownian motion, and σe is the standard
deviation of the market return. Let ρye be the contemporaneous correlation between the labor in-
come process and the return of the risky asset. When ρye = 0, the labor income risk is idiosyncratic
and is uncorrelated with the risky market return; when ρye = 1, the labor income risk is perfectly
correlated with the risky market return. The agent’s financial wealth evolution is then given by
dwt = (rwt + yt − ct) dt + αt (pidt + σedBe,t) , (3)
where αt denotes the amount of wealth that the investor allocates to the market portfolio at time t.
The typical consumer is assumed to maximize the following expected lifetime utility:
E0
[ˆ ∞
t=0
exp (−δt) u(ct)dt
]
,
subject to (3). The utility function takes the CARA form: u(ct) = − exp (−γct) /γ, where γ > 0 is
the coefficient of absolute risk aversion.11 To simplify the model, we define a new state variable,
10If ρ > 0, the income process is stationary and deviations of income from the steady state are temporary; if ρ ≤ 0,
income is non-stationary. The ρ = 0 case corresponds to a simple Brownian motion without drift. The larger ρ is, the
less y tends to drift away from y. As ρ goes to ∞, the variance of y goes to 0, which means that y can never deviate from
y.
11It is well-known that the CARA utility specification is tractable for deriving the consumption function or optimal
consumption-portfolio rules in different settings. See Merton (1969), Caballero (1990), Svensson and Werner (1993), Weil
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st:
st ≡ wt + ht,
where ht is human wealth at time t and is defined as the expected present value of current and
future labor income discounted at the risk-free interest rate r:
ht ≡ Et
[ˆ ∞
t
exp (−r (s− t)) ysds
]
.
For the given the income process, (1), ht = 1r+ρyt +
µ
r(r+ρ) . Following the state-space-reduction
approach proposed in Luo (2008) and using this new state variable, we can rewrite (3) as
dst = (rst − ct + piαt) dt + σdBt, (4)
where σdBt = σeαtdBe,t + σsdBy,t, σs = σy/ (r + ρ), and
σ =
√
σ2e α
2
t + σ
2
s + 2ρyeσsσeαt (5)
is the unconditional variance of the innovation to st.12
In this benchmark full-information rational expectations (FI-RE) model, we assume that the
consumer trusts the model and observes the state perfectly, i.e., no model uncertainty and no state
uncertainty. The value function is denoted by J (st). The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation
for this optimizing problem can be written as:
0 = sup
ct,αt
[
− 1
γ
exp (−γct)− δJ (st) +D J (st)
]
,
where
D J (st) = Js (rst − ct + piαt) + 12 Jss
(
σ2e α
2
t + σ
2
s + 2ρyeσsσeαt
)
. (6)
Solving the above HJB subject to (4) leads to the following optimal portfolio-consumption rules:13
α =
pi
rγσ2e
− ρyeσsσe
σ2e
, (7)
and
ct = rst +
δ− r
rγ
+
pi2
2rγσ2e
− piρyeσsσe
σ2e
− Γ, (8)
where
Γ ≡ 1
2
rγ
(
1− ρ2ye
)
σ2s , (9)
(1993), and Wang (2004, 2009).
12The main advantage of this state-space-reduction approach is to allow us to solve the model with model uncertainty
and state uncertainty explicitly and help better inspect the mechanism by which the informational frictions interact
and affect optimal consumption-portfolio rules. It is worth noting that the reduced univariate model and the original
multivariate model are equivalent in the sense that they lead to the same consumption-portfolio rules. The detailed
proof is available from the author by request.
13This solution is similar to that obtained in Model I of Wang (2009).
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is the investor’s precautionary saving demand. The first term in (7) is the standard speculation
demand for the risky asset, which is positively correlated with the risk premium of the risky asset
over the risk free asset and is negatively correlated with the degree of risk aversion and the variance
of the return to the risky asset. The second term in (7) is the labor income hedging demand of the
risky asset. When ρye 6= 0, i.e., the income shock is not purely idiosyncratic, the desirability of the
risky asset depends not only on its expected excess return relative to its variance, but also on its
ability to hedge consumption against bad realizations of labor income. Following the literature of
precautionary savings, we measure the demand for precautionary saving as the amount of saving
due to the interaction of the degree of risk aversion and non-diversifiable labor income risk.14 If
labor income is perfectly correlated with the return to the risky asset (i.e., ρye = ±1), the market
is complete and the consumer can fully hedge his labor income risk; consequently, his demand for
precautionary saving is 0.
3. Incorporating Model Uncertainty
3.1. Modeling Robustness
As argued in Hansen and Sargent (2007), a simplest version of robustness considers the question
of how to make optimal decisions when the decision maker does not know the true probability
model that generates the data. The main goal of introducing robustness is to design optimal poli-
cies that not only work well when the reference (or approximating) model governing the evolution
of the state variables is the true model, but also perform reasonably well when there is some type
of model misspecification. To introduce robustness into our model proposed above, we follow the
continuous-time methodology proposed by Anderson, Hansen, and Sargent (2003) (henceforth,
AHS) and adopted in Maenhout (2004) to assume that consumers are concerned about the model
misspecifications and take Equation (4) as the approximating model.15 The corresponding distort-
ing model can thus be obtained by adding an endogenous distortion υ (st) to (4):
dst = (rst − ct + piαt) dt + σ (συ (st) dt + dBt) . (10)
As shown in AHS (2003), the objective D J defined in (6) plays a crucial role in introducing robust-
ness. D J can be thought of as E [dJ] /dt and is easily obtained using Itô’s lemma. A key insight
of AHS (2003) is that this differential expectations operator reflects a particular underlying model
for the state variable. The consumer accepts the approximating model, (4), as the best approxi-
mating model, but is still concerned that it is misspecified. He therefore wants to consider a range
of models (i.e., the distorted model, (10)) surrounding the approximating model when computing
the continuation payoff. A preference for robustness is then achieved by having the agent guard
against the distorting model that is reasonably close to the approximating model. The drift adjust-
ment υ (st) is chosen to minimize the sum of (i) the expected continuation payoff adjusted to reflect
14Note that hedging with the risky asset
(
ρye 6= 0
)
reduces the consumer’s precautionary saving demand.
15As argued in Hansen and Sargent (2007), the agent’s committment technology is irrelevant under RB if the evolution
of the state is backward-looking. We therefore do not specifiy the committment technology of the consumer in the RB
models of this paper.
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the additional drift component in (10) and (ii) an entropy penalty:
inf
υ
[
D J + υ (st) σ2 Js + 12ϑt υ (st)
2 σ2
]
,
where the first two terms are the expected continuation payoff when the state variable follows
(10), i.e., the alternative model based on drift distortion υ (st).16 ϑt is fixed and state independent
in AHS (2003), whereas it is state-dependent in Maenhout (2004). The key reason of using a state-
dependent counterpart ϑt in Maenhout (2004) is to assure the homotheticity or scale invariance of
the decision problem with the CRRA utility function.17 In this paper, we also specify that ϑt is
state-dependent (ϑ (st)) in the CARA-Gaussian setting. The main reason for this specification is to
guarantee the homotheticity, which makes robustness not wear off as the value of the total wealth
increases.18
Applying these results in the above model yields the following HJB equation under robustness:
sup
ct,αt
inf
υt
[
− 1
γ
exp (−γct)− δJ (st) +D J (st) + υ (st) σ2 Js + 12ϑ (st)υ (st)
2 σ2
]
, (11)
where the last term in the HJB above is due to the agent’s preference for robustness and reflects a
concern about the quadratic variation in the partial derivative of the value function weighted by
ϑ.19 Solving first for the infimization part of (11) yields:
υ (st)
∗ = −ϑ (st) Js,
where ϑ (st) = −ϑ/J (st) > 0 and ϑ is a constant. (See Appendix 7.1 for the derivation.) Because
ϑ (st) > 0, the perturbation adds a negative drift term to the state transition equation because
Js > 0. Substituting for υ∗ in (11) gives:
sup
ct,αt
[
− 1
γ
exp (−γct)− δJ (st) + (rst − ct + piαt) Js + 12σ
2 Jss − 12ϑ (st) σ
2 J2s
]
. (12)
3.2. Theoretical Implications
Following the standard procedure, we can then solve (12) and obtain the optimal consumption-
portfolio rules under robustness. The following proposition summarizes the solution:
Proposition 1. Under robustness, the optimal consumption and portfolio rules under robustness are
c∗t = rst +
δ− r
rγ
+
pi2
2rγσ2e
− piρyeσsσe
σ2e
− Γ, (13)
16Note that the ϑ = 0 case corresponds to the standard expected utility case.
17See Maenhout (2004) for detailed discussions on the appealing features of “homothetic robustness”.
18In the detailed procedure of solving the robust HJB proposed in Appendix 7.1, it is clear that the impact of robustness
wears off if we assume that ϑt is constant.
19See AHS (2003) and Maenhout (2004) for detailed discussions.
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and
α∗ =
pi
rγ˜σ2e
− ρyeσsσe
σ2e
, (14)
respectively, where the effective coefficient of absolute risk aversion γ˜ is defined as: γ˜ ≡ (1+ ϑ) γ and the
precautionary savings demand, Γ, is
Γ =
1
2
rγ˜
(
1− ρ2ye
)
σ2s . (15)
Finally, the worst possible distortion can be written as
υ∗ = −rγϑ. (16)
Proof. See Appendix 7.1.
From (13), it is clear that robustness does not change the marginal propensity to consume out of
permanent income (MPC), but affects the amount of precautionary savings (Γ). In other words, in
the continuous-time setting, consumption is not sensitive to unanticipated income shocks. This
conclusion is different from that obtained in the discrete-time robust-LQG permanent income
model in which the MPC is increased via the interaction between RB and income uncertainty and
consumption is more sensitive to unanticipated shocks.20
Expression (14) shows that RB reduces the optimal speculation demand by a factor, 1 + ϑ, but
does not affect the hedging demand of the risky asset. In other words, RB increases the relative
importance of the income hedging demand to the speculation demand by increasing the effective
coefficient of absolute risk aversion (γ˜). Expression (15) shows that the precautionary savings
premium increases with the degree of robustness (ϑ) by increasing the value of γ˜ and interacting
with two types of fundamental uncertainty: labor income uncertainty (σ2s ) and the correlation
between labor income and the equity return (ρye). An interesting question here is the relative
importance of RB (ϑ) and CARA (γ) in determining the precautionary savings premium, holding
other parameters constant. We can use the elasticities of precautionary saving as a measure of their
importance. Specifically, using (15), we have the following proposition:
Proposition 2. The relative importance of robustness (RB, ϑ) and CARA (γ) in determining precautionary
saving can be measured by:
µγϑ ≡ eγeϑ =
1+ ϑ
ϑ
> 1, (17)
where eϑ ≡ ∂Γ/Γ∂ϑ/ϑ = and eγ ≡ ∂Γ/Γ∂γ/γ are the elasticities of the precautionary saving demand to RB and CARA,
respectively. (17) means that absolute risk aversion measured by γ is more important than RB measured by
ϑ in determining the precautionary savings demand. Note that Expression (17) can also measure the relative
importance of RB and CARA in determining portfolio choice.
Proof. Using (14) and (15), the proof is straightforward.
20See HST (1999) and Luo and Young (2010) for detailed discussions on how RB affects consumption and precaution-
ary savings in the discrete-time robust-LQG models.
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Using (17), it is straightforward to show that ∂µγϑ/∂ϑ > 0, which means that µγϑ is increasing
with the degree of RB, ϑ. To fully explore the quantitative effects of robustness on portfolio choice
and precautionary saving, we need to calibrate ϑ using the detection error probability approach
(DEP) proposed in Hansen, Sargent, and Wang (henceforth, HSW, 2002), AHS (2003), and Hansen
and Sargent (Chapter 9, 2007). In the next subsection, we will examine the relative importance of
RB to CARA quantitatively after calibrating ϑ using the U.S. data.
Proposition 3. The observational equivalence between the discount factor and robustness established in
the discrete-time Hansen-Sargent-Tallarini (1999) does not hold in our continuous-time CARA-Gaussian
model.
Hansen, Sargent, and Tallarini (1999) (henceforth, HST) show that the discount factor and the
concern about robustness are observationally equivalent in the sense that they lead to the same
consumption and investment decisions in a discrete-time LQG permanent income model. The rea-
son is that introducing a concern about robustness increases savings in the same way as increasing
the discount factor, so that the discount factor can be changed to offset the effect of a change in
RS or RB on consumption and investment.21 In contrast, in the continuous-time CARA-Gaussian
model discussed in this section, the observational equivalence between the discount rate and the
RB parameter no longer holds. This result can be readily obtained by inspecting the explicit ex-
pressions of consumption, precautionary savings, and portfolio choice, (13)-(15). First, ϑ affects
optimal portfolio choice via increasing γ˜, whereas δ does not enter the portfolio rule. Second, al-
though both the discount factor (exp (−δ)) and γ reduce the constant term in the consumption
function and their observational equivalence can be established in the sense that they generate the
same value of the constant term, they imply different portfolio choices.22
3.3. Empirical Implications
3.3.1. Calibrating the Robustness Parameter
To fully explore how RB affects the joint behavior of portfolio choice, consumption, and labor
income, we adopt the calibration procedure outlined in HSW (2002) and AHS (2003) to calibrate the
value of the RB parameter (ϑ) that governs the degree of robustness. Specifically, we calibrate ϑ by
using the method of detection error probabilities (DEP) that is based on a statistical theory of model
selection. We can then infer what values of ϑ imply reasonable fears of model misspecification for
empirically-plausible approximating models. The model detection error probability denoted by p
is a measure of how far the distorted model can deviate from the approximating model without
being discarded; low values for this probability mean that agents are unwilling to discard many
models, implying that the cloud of models surrounding the approximating model is large. In this
case, it is easier for the consumer to distinguish the two models. The value of p is determined by
21As shown in HST (1999), the two models have different implications for asset prices because continuation valuations
would change as one alters the values of the discount factor and the robustness parameter within the observational
equivalence set.
22Note that the precautionary saving demand is included in the constant term.
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the following procedure. Let model P denote the approximating model, (4):
dst = (rst − ct + piαt) dt + σdBt,
and model Q be the distorted model, (10):
dst = (rst − ct + piαt) dt + σ (συ (st) dt + dBt) .
Define pP as
pP = Prob
(
ln
(
LQ
LP
)
> 0
∣∣∣∣ P) , (18)
where ln
(
LQ
LP
)
is the log-likelihood ratio. When model P generates the data, pP measures the
probability that a likelihood ratio test selects model Q. In this case, we call pP the probability of
the model detection error. Similarly, when model Q generates the data, we can define pQ as
pQ = Prob
(
ln
(
LP
LQ
)
> 0
∣∣∣∣Q) . (19)
Given initial priors of 0.5 on each model and that the length of the sample is N, the detection error
probability, p, can be written as:
p (ϑ; N) =
1
2
(pP + pQ) , (20)
where ϑ is the robustness parameter used to generate model Q. Given this definition, we can see
that 1− p measures the probability that econometricians can distinguish the approximating model
from the distorted model.
The general idea of the calibration procedure is to find a value of ϑ such that p (ϑ; N) equals
a given value (for example, 10%) after simulating model P, (4), and model Q, (10).23 In the
continuous-time model with the iid Gaussian specification, p (ϑ; N) can be easily computed. Be-
cause both models P and Q are arithmetic Brownian motions with constant drift and diffusion
coefficients, the log-likelihood ratios are Brownian motions and are normally distributed random
variables. Specifically, the logarithm of the Radon-Nikodym derivative of the distorted model (Q)
with respect to the approximating model (P) can be written as
ln
(
LQ
LP
)
= −
ˆ N
0
υdBs − 12
ˆ N
0
υ2ds, (21)
where
υ ≡ υ∗σ = −rγϑ
√
σ2e α
2 + σ2s + 2ρyeσsσeα. (22)
Similarly, the logarithm of the Radon-Nikodym derivative of the approximating model (P) with
23The number of periods used in the calculation, N, is set to be the actual length of the data we study. For example, if
we consider the post-war U.S. annual time series data provided by Robert Shiller from 1946− 2010, T = 65.
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respect to the distorted model (Q) is
ln
(
LP
LQ
)
=
ˆ N
0
υdBs +
1
2
ˆ N
0
υ2ds. (23)
Using (18)-(23), it is straightforward to derive p (ϑ; N):
p (ϑ; N) = Pr
(
x <
υ
2
√
N
)
, (24)
where x follows a standard normal distribution. From the expressions of υ, (22), and p (ϑ; N), (24),
we can show that the value of p is decreasing with the value of ϑ because ∂α∗/∂ϑ < 0.
3.3.2. Some Results
Using the data set documented in Campbell (2003), we set the parameter values for the processes
of returns, volatility, and consumption as follows: µ = 0.08, r = 0.02, δ = 0.02, σe = 0.156, and
σc = 0.011. For the labor income process, we follow Wang (2009) and set that σy = 0.1. When
ρ = 0, i.e., when labor income follows a Brownian motion, we can compute that σs = 5. Figure
1 illustrates how DEP (p) varies with the value of ϑ for different values of γ. We can see from
the figure that the stronger the preference for robustness (higher ϑ), the less the p is. For example,
when γ = 2, p = 10% when ϑ = 1.4, while p = 16% when ϑ = 1.24 Both values of p are reasonable
as argued in AHS (2002), HSW (2002), Maenhout (2004), and Hansen and Sargent (Chapter 9, 2007).
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate how p varies with the value of ϑ for different values of σs and ρye,
respectively.25 These figures also show that the higher the value of ϑ, the less the p is. In addition,
to calibrate the same value of p, less values of σs (i.e., more volatile or higher persistent labor
income processes) or higher values of ρye lead to higher values of ϑ. The intuition behind this
result is that σs and ϑ have opposite effects on υ. (This is clear from (22).) To keep the same value
of p, if one parameter increases, the other one must reduce to offset its effect on υ. As emphasized
in Hansen and Sargent (2007), in the robustness model, p is the deep model parameter governing
the preference for RB, and ϑ reflects the effect of RB on the model’s behavior. Combining these facts
with the expression for robust portfolio rule, (14), we can see that an increase in ρye not only reduces
the hedging demand directly, but also reduces the standard speculation demand of the risky asset
by affecting the calibrated values of ϑ using the same values of p. In contrast, an increase in σs
reduces the hedging demand, but increases the speculation demand.
From the expression for robust portfolio rule, (14), we can see that plausible values of RB can
significantly affect the share invested in the risky asset. Figure 4 illustrates how robust portfolio
rule varies with the degree of RB for different values of ρye. It clearly shows that α∗ decreases with
the value of ϑ for different values of ρye. In addition, it is also clear from the same figure that α∗
24Caballero (1990) and Wang (2004) also set γ = 2.
25Note that since σs = σy/ (r + ρ), the value of σs can measure the persistence (ρ) and volatility
(
σy
)
of the labor
income process.
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decreases with ρye for a given value of ϑ. The intuition behind this result is the same as that in the
FI-RE case: When the labor income risk becomes more positively correlated with the shock to the
equity return, the equity is less desirable and the agent thus invests less in it.
Figure 4 also illustrates how the precautionary saving demand (Γ) varies with the degree of RB
for different values of ρye. It clearly shows that Γ increases with the value of ϑ for different values of
ρye and RB has a very significant impact on precautionary savings. For example, when ρye = 0.35,
Γ = 0.63 when ϑ = 1, while Γ = 0.96 when ϑ = 1.4. Furthermore, we can see that Γ decreases
with ρye for a given value of ϑ. The intuition for this result is that the higher the value of ρye, the
more important the hedging demand for the equity, and thus the less demand for precautionary
savings.
4. Incorporating State Uncertainty
4.1. Information-Processing Constraint
So far we have considered the case in which the consumer can observe the state perfectly. In this
section, we consider a situation in which the typical consumer with the preference for robustness
cannot observe the state (s) perfectly due to finite information-processing capacity (rational inat-
tention, or RI). That is, the typical consumer can neither observe st, nor can he observe the source
of innovation dBt, included in the state transition equation, (4):
dst = (rst − ct + piαt) dt + σdBt. (25)
Following Kasa (2006) and Reis (2011), we assume that the consumer observes only a noisy signal
containing imperfect information about st:
ds∗t = stdt + dξt, (26)
where ξt is the noise shock, and is a Brownian motion with mean 0 and variance Λ. (In the RI
setting, the variance, Λ, is a choice variable for the agent.) Note that here we assume that the
consumer receives signals on stdt rather than on dst. As emphasized in Sims (1998) and discussed
in Kasa (2006) and Reis (2011), the latter specification is not suitable to model state uncertainty
due to finite capacity because this specification means that in any finite interval, arbitrarily large
amounts of information can be passed through the consumer’s channel. In addition, following the
RI literature, we assume that ξt is independent of the Brownian motion governing the fundamental
shock, Bt.26
To model RI due to finite capacity, we impose the following constraint on the consumer’s
26In the traditional signal extraction literature, sometimes it is assumed that the fundamental shock and the noise
shock (or measure errors) are correlated. In real systems, we do observe correlated shocks and noises. For example, if
the system is an airplane and winds are buffeting the plane, the effects of the random wind on the airplane’ acceleration
are complex. This disturbance effect could be modeled as dBt. Sensors on the airplane can measure its angle and velocity
relative to the air, and these measurements modeled as dξt are corrupted by the same wind field that forces the airplane.
See Stengel (Chapter 4, 1994) for a discussion on correlated process and measurement noise.
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information-processing ability:
H (st+∆t|It)−H (st+∆t|It+∆t)≤ κ∆t, (27)
where κ is the consumer’s information channel capacity, H (st+∆t|It) denotes the entropy of the
state prior to observing the new signal at t+ ∆t, andH (st+∆t|It+∆t) is the entropy after observing
the new signal. κ imposes an upper bound on the amount of information – that is, the change in
the entropy – that can be transmitted in any given period. To apply this information constraint to
the state transition equation, we first rewrite (25) in the time interval of [t, t + ∆t]:27
st+∆t = ρ0,t + ρ1st + ρ2
√
∆tεt+∆t, (28)
where ρ0,t = (−ct + piαt) (1− exp (r∆t)) / (−r∆t), ρ1 = exp (r∆t), ρ2 = σ
√
(1− exp (2r∆t)) / (−2r∆t),
and εt+∆t is the time-(t + ∆t) standard normal distributed innovation to permanent income. Tak-
ing conditional variances on both sides of (28) and substituting it into (27), we have
ln
(
ρ21Σt + ρ
2
2
)− ln (Σt+∆t) ≤ 2κ∆t, (29)
which reduces to ·
Σt = 2 (r− κ)Σt + σ2,
as ∆t → 0, where Σt = Et
[
(st − ŝt)2
]
the conditional variance at t. (See Appendix 7.2 for a proof.)
In the steady state in which
·
Σt = 0, the steady state conditional variance can be written as:28
Σ =
σ2
2 (κ − r) . (30)
To make optimal decisions, the consumer is required to filter in the optimal way the value of st
using the observed s∗t . Although the setting of our CARA-Gaussian model is not a typical tracking
problem, the filtering problem in this model could be similar to the tracking problem proposed in
Sims (2003, 2010). Specifically, we may think that the model with imperfect state observations can
be decomposed into a two-stage optimization procedure:29
1. The optimal filtering problem determines the optimal evolution of the perceived (estimated)
state;
2. The optimal control problem in which the decision makers treat the perceived state as the
underlying state when making optimal decisions.
Here we assume ex post Gaussian distributions and Gaussian noise but adopt exponential or
27Note that here we use the fact that ∆Bt = εt
√
∆t, where ∆Bt represents the increment of a Wiener process.
28Note that here we need to impose the restriction κ− r > 0. If this condition fails, the state is not stabilizable and the
conditional variance diverges.
29See Liptser and Shiryayev (2001) for a textbook treatment on this topic and an application in a precautionary saving
model in Wang (2004).
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CARA preferences. See Peng (2004), Mondria (2010), and Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009,
2010) for this specification. Because both the optimality of ex post Gaussianity and the standard
Kalman filter are based on the linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) specification, the applications of
these results in the RI models with CARA preferences are only approximately valid. Specifically,
following the Kalman-Bucy filtering method, the optimal estimate for st given Ft=
{
s∗j
}t
j=0
in the
mean square sense coincides with the conditional expectation: ŝt = Et [st], where Et [·] is based on
Ft. The filtering equations for ŝt and Σt can be written as30
dŝt = (rŝt − ct + piαt) dt + θtdηt, (31)
·
Σt = −Λθ2t + 2rΣt + σ2, (32)
given ŝ0 and Σ0, where
θt =
Σt
Λ
(33)
is the Kalman gain and
dηt =
√
ΛdB∗t , (34)
with mean E [dηt] = 0 and var (dηt) = Λdt, where B∗t is a standard Brownian motion. Note that
ηt is a Brownian motion with mean 0. Although the Brownian variable, ξt, is not observable, the
innovation process, ηt, is observable because it is derived from observable processes (i.e., ds∗t and
(rŝt − ct + piαt) dt). In this case, the path of the conditional expectation, ŝt, is generated by the path
of the innovation process, ηt. In the steady state, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 4. Given finite capacity κ, in the steady state, the evolution of the perceived state can be written
as
dŝt = (rŝt − ct + piαt) dt + σ̂dB∗t , (35)
where
σ̂ ≡ Σ/
√
Λ = f (κ) σ, (36)
f (κ) =
√
κ
κ−r > 1 (i.e., the standard deviation of the estimated state is greater than that of the true state,)
Λ =
σ2
4κ (κ − r) (37)
is the steady state conditional variance, and
θ = 2κ (38)
is the corresponding Kalman gain.
30See Liptser and Shiryaev (2001) for deriving the filtering equations updating the conditional mean and variance of
the state.
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Proof. Using Σ = σ
2
2(κ−r) and (32), we can easily obtain that:
Λ =
σ2
4κ (κ − r) and θ = 2κ.
It is worth noting that the above RI case can be observationally equivalent to the traditional
signal extraction case in which the steady state variance of the noise (Λ) or the signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR, σ2/Λ) are specified exogenously. Dividing Λ on both sides of (32), we obtain the following
differential Riccati equation governing the evolution of θt:
·
θt = −θ2t + 2rθt +
σ2
Λ
, (39)
where σ2/Λ is the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) in this problem. In the steady state, we have the
following proposition for this signal extraction case with exogenous noises:
Proposition 5. Given SNR
(
σ2/Λ
)
, in the steady state, the evolution of the perceived state can be written
as
dŝt = (rŝt − ct + piαt) dt + σ̂dB∗t ,
where
σ̂ ≡ θ
√
Λ = g (τ) σ, (40)
θ = r +
√
r2 +
σ2
Λ
, (41)
g (τ) ≡ r√τ + √1+ r2τ > 1, and τ ≡ 1/ SNR = Λ/σ2. Furthermore, if SNR and κ satisfy the
following equality:
SNR = 4κ (κ − r) ,
then the RI and SE cases are observationally equivalent in the sense that they lead to the same model dynam-
ics.
Proof. In the steady state in which
·
θt = 0, solving the following algebraic Riccati equation,
−θ2t + 2rθt +
σ2
Λ
= 0,
yields the steady state Kalman gain:
θ = r +
√
r2 +
σ2
Λ
. (42)
and steady state conditional variance: Σ = θΛ.
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4.2. Interaction between Model Uncertainty and State Uncertainty
In this section, we assume that the typical consumer not only cannot observe the state perfectly,
but also has concerns about the innovation to perceived permanent income. In the model with
both state uncertainty and model uncertainty, the prior variance of s, σ2, is affected by the optimal
portfolio choice, α∗, which is to be determined after solving the whole model with both model
uncertainty (ϑ) and state uncertainty (κ or SNR). Given the value of κ, the value of the variance
of the noise (Λ) should also be endogenously determined by α∗. The following is the two-stage
procedure to solve the optimization problem of the consumer under both model uncertainty (MU)
and state uncertainty (SU):
1. First, given finite SNR, we guess that the optimal portfolio choice under MU and SU is time-
invariant, i.e., αt = α. Consequently, σ =
√
σ2e α
2 + σ2s + 2ρyeσsσeα is also time-invariant. The
consumer with imperfect information about the state (SNR > 0) understands that he cannot
observe st perfectly and needs to use the Kalman filter, (31), to update the perceived state
when making decisions. In other words, (31) is regarded as the approximating model in this
MU-SU model. The consumer solves the following HJB:
sup
ct,α
inf
υt
[
− 1
γ
exp (−γct)− δJ (ŝt) +D J (ŝt) + υ (ŝt) σ2 Js + 12ϑ (ŝt)υ (ŝt)
2 σ2
]
, (43)
subject to the distorted model:
dŝt = (rŝt − ct + piα) dt + σ̂
(
σ̂υ (ŝt) dt + dB˜t
)
, (44)
where σ̂ ≡ f (κ) σ and f (κ) =
√
κ
κ−r > 1.
2. Second, after solving for optimal consumption and portfolio rules under RB and RI, we can
verify whether the resulting portfolio rule is time-variant or not. If yes, our guess in the first
step is correct and can thus rationalize the above procedure we used to derive the stochastic
property of the endogenous noise, Λ. The key reason is that time-invariant α yields time-
invariant variance of the fundamental shock (σ).
The following proposition summarizes the solution to (43)-(44):
Proposition 6. Given ϑ and θ, the optimal consumption and portfolio rules under robustness are
c∗t = rŝt +
δ− r
rγ
+
pi2
2rγσ2e
− piρyeσsσe
σ2e
− Γ (45)
and
α∗ =
pi
rγ˜ f (κ) σ2e
− ρyeσsσe
σ2e
, (46)
respectively, where ŝt is governed by (44), we use the fact that σ̂2 = f (κ)
2 σ2, and γ˜ ≡ (1+ ϑ) γ, and the
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precautionary savings premium, Γ, is
Γ =
1
2
rγ˜ f (κ)2
(
1− ρ2ye
)
σ2s . (47)
Finally, the worst possible distortion can be written as υ∗ = −rγϑ.
Proof. See Appendix 7.3.
From (45), it is clear that robustness does not change the marginal propensity to consume
(MPC) out of perceived permanent income (ŝt), but affects the amount of precautionary savings. In
other words, in the continuous-time setting, consumption is not sensitive to unanticipated income
shocks. This conclusion is different from that obtained in the discrete-time robust-LQG perma-
nent income model in which the MPC is increased via the interaction between RB and income
uncertainty, and consumption is more sensitive to unanticipated shocks.31
Given (45)-(47), it is straightforward to show that the observational equivalence between the
discount rate and the RB parameter no longer holds in the MU-SU model. The reason is the same
as that in the model without SU: ϑ affects optimal portfolio choice via increasing γ˜, whereas δ does
not enter the portfolio rule. That is, although both the discount factor (exp (−δ)) and γ increase
the precautionary savings premium and their observational equivalence can be established in the
sense that they generate the same value of Γ, they imply different portfolio choices. Comparing
(13) with (45), it is clear that the certainty equivalence principle holds in this model, i.e., the con-
sumption function under SU can be easily obtained by replacing the true state with the perceived
state.
Expression (46) shows that finite capacity (κ) affects the speculation demand invested in the
risky asset (the first term in (46)). Given that f (κ) =
√
κ/ (κ − r) > 1, we can see that SU reduces
the share invested in the risky asset. The intuition behind this result is that consumption reacts to
the income and asset return shocks gradually and with delay due to extracting useful information
about the true state from noisy observations. In other words, SU and MU affect the optimal port-
folio choice in the same direction. Figure 5 illustrates how strategic portfolio rule (α∗) varies with
the degree of SU (κ) for different plausible values of γ. It clearly shows that α∗ decreases with
the value of κ for any given value of γ. In addition, it is also clear from the same figure that α∗
decreases with γ for a given value of κ, which is consistent with the result obtained in the model
without SU.
Expression (47) shows that the precautionary savings demand is increases the degree of SU
governed by f (κ). Figure 5 also illustrates how the precautionary saving demand (Γ) varies with
the degree of SU for different plausible values of γ. It clearly shows that Γ increases with the value
of κ for different values of γ and SU has a significant impact on precautionary savings.
31See HST (1999) and Luo and Young (2010) for detailed discussions on how RB affects consumption and precaution-
ary savings in the discrete-time LQG permanent income models.
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As in the previous section, we use the elasticities of precautionary saving to changes in the
degrees of MU and SU as a measure of their importance. Specifically, using (47), we have the
following proposition:
Proposition 7. The relative importance of model uncertainty (MU, ϑ) and state uncertainty (SU, κ) can
be measured by:
µϑκ ≡ − eϑeκ =
ϑ
1+ ϑ
κ − r
r
, (48)
where eϑ ≡ ∂Γ/Γ∂ϑ/ϑ and eκ ≡ ∂Γ/Γ∂κ/κ are the elasticities of precautionary saving to model uncertainty and state
uncertainty, respectively. Furthermore, when
κ < (≥) r
(
2+
1
ϑ
)
,
state uncertainty is more (less) important than model uncertainty in determining the precautionary sav-
ing demand. In other words, when finite capacity is sufficiently low, state uncertainty becomes relatively
important in determining the precautionary saving demand.
Proof. The proof is straightforward using (48) and the facts that µϑκ ≡
(
∂Γ/Γ
∂ϑ˜/ϑ˜
∂ϑ˜/ϑ˜
∂ϑ/ϑ
)
/
(
∂Γ/Γ
∂ f / f
∂ f / f
∂κ/κ
)
,
where ϑ˜ = 1+ ϑ.
Using (48), it is straightforward to show that
∂µϑκ
∂ϑ
> 0 and
∂µϑκ
∂κ
> 0,
which mean that µϑκ is increasing with the degree of RB, ϑ, while is decreasing with the degree of
SU (i.e., less values of κ).
Using (45) and (46), we can obtain the stochastic properties of the joint dynamics of consump-
tion, labor income, and the equity return. The following proposition summarizes the major results
on the effects of RB on the joint behavior of consumption, labor income, and the equity return:
Proposition 8. Given ϑ and κ, the expected growth of consumption is
gc ≡ E [dc
∗
t ]
dt
= −δ− r
rγ
+
1
2
r f (κ)2 γ˜
(
1− ρ2ye
)
σ2s +
pi2
2r f (κ) γ˜σ2e
, (49)
the volatility of consumption growth is var (dc∗t ) = r2 f (κ)
2 σ2, where σ is given in (5) and α∗ is given in
(46), the relative volatility of consumption growth to income growth is
µ ≡ sd (dc
∗
t )
sd (dyt)
=
r f (κ)
r + ρ
√
1− ρ2ye +
[
pi (r + ρ)
γ˜σeσy
]2
, (50)
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and the contemporaneous correlation between consumption growth and the equity return is
ρcy ≡ corr (dc∗t , dyt) = f (κ)
(
1− ρ2ye
)
σs + piρye/ (rγ˜σe)√(
1− ρ2ye
)
σ2s + pi
2/ (rγ˜σe)
2
. (51)
Proof. See Appendix 7.3.
Expression (49) clearly shows that both RB and RI can affect the expected consumption growth
by interacting with two sources of fundamental uncertainty: (i) labor income uncertainty
(
σ2s
)
and
(ii) asset return uncertainty
(
σ2e
)
. Specifically, we have
∂gc
∂ϑ
> 0 if ϑ >
pi
rγ
√
f (κ)3
√
1− ρ2yeσsσe
− 1.
Using the same parameter values above, we can compute that RB can increase the expected growth
rate if ϑ is greater than 0.4 when κ = 0.1. (Here we set ρye = 0.18.) In contrast, RB can increase the
expected growth rate if ϑ is greater than 0.76 when κ = 0.3. Furthermore, we have
∂gc
∂κ
< 0 if κ > κ ≡ r
1−
{
pi2/
[
2 (rγ˜)2
(
1− ρ2ye
)
σ2s σ
2
e
]}−2/3 .
Because κ is negative for the plausible parameter values, SU (less κ) can always increase the ex-
pected growth rate. (See Figure 6.)
From Expression (50), we can see that RB reduces the relative volatility of consumption growth
to income growth by increasing γ˜ and reducing the optimal share invested in the risky asset. This
result is different from that obtained in the permanent income model in which RB increases the
relative volatility of consumption growth to income growth by strengthening the consumption
sensitivity to income shocks.32 It is also clear from (50) that SU measured by f (κ) increases the
relative volatility. This effect is similar to that obtained in the discrete-time permanent income
model. (See Luo (2008) for a proof on how SU increases the relative volatility of consumption
growth to income growth at the individual level.) Figure 6 illustrates how gc varies with the degree
of SU (κ) for different plausible values of γ. It is clear from the figure that the quantitative impact
of SU on gc is much stronger than that of MU on gc.
Since
∣∣ρye∣∣ ≤ 1, we have
∂ρcy
∂ϑ
> 0,
which means that RB raises the contemporaneous correlation between consumption growth and
income growth. In addition, ρcy = 1√
1+pi2/(rγ˜σsσe)
2 when labor income is purely idiosyncratic, i.e.,
32See Luo and Young (2010) for a proof that RB worsens the PIH model’s prediction on the relative volatility of
consumption growth to income growth.
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ρye = 0, while ρcy = 1 when the income risk and the return risk are perfectly correlated. From (51),
it is obvious that SU increases ρcy. (See Figure 6.)
4.3. Empirical Implications
In this section, we adopt the same calibration procedure in the last section to calibrate the value of ϑ
for a given DEP, p, in the MU-SU model. In this case, let model P denote the approximating model,
(35) and model Q be the distorted model, (44). Because both models P and Q are arithmetic Brow-
nian motions with constant drift and diffusion coefficients under MU-SU, the log-likelihood ratios
are normally distributed random variables. Consequently, the logarithm of the Radon-Nikodym
derivative of the distorted model (Q) with respect to the approximating model (P) can be written
as
ln
(
LQ
LP
)
= −
ˆ N
0
υdBs − 12
ˆ N
0
υ2ds, (52)
where
υ ≡ υ∗σ̂ = −rγϑ
√
σ2e α
∗2 + σ2s + 2ρyeσsσeα∗. (53)
Similarly, the logarithm of the Radon-Nikodym derivative of the approximating model (P) with
respect to the distorted model (Q) is
ln
(
LP
LQ
)
=
ˆ N
0
υdBs +
1
2
ˆ N
0
υ2ds. (54)
Given (52) and (54), it is straightforward to derive p (ϑ; N):
p (ϑ; N) = Pr
(
x <
υ
2
√
N
)
, (55)
where x follows a standard normal distribution.
Using the same parameter values as in the last section, Figure 7 illustrates how p varies with
the value of ϑ for different values of κ. We can see from the figure that the stronger the preference
for robustness (higher ϑ), the less the p is. Tables 1 and 2 report how different values of κ affect cal-
ibrated values of ϑ, optimal allocation in the risky asset (α∗), the relative importance of the income
hedging demand to the speculation demand (
∣∣α∗h∣∣ /α∗s ), and precautionary saving demand (Γ) for
different values of ρye and σs, respectively.33 Specifically, for given values of σs and ρye, when κ
decreases (i.e., more information-constrained), the calibrate value of ϑ increases; consequently, the
optimal share invested in the risky asset decreases and the relative importance of the income hedg-
ing demand to the speculation demand increases. In addition, the precautionary saving demand
decreases with the value of κ.
From Table 1, we can see that for given values of κ, the precautionary saving demand decreases
with the correlation between the equity return and labor income risk (ρye), holding other factors
33Here the values of ρye are set to be 0, 0.18, and 0.35 according to Campbell and Viceira (Chapter 6, 2002), and the
values of σy are chosen to be the same as that used in Wang (2009).
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constant, which is consistent with that we obtained in the MU model. The intuition is that the
higher the correlation coefficient, the less demand for the risky asset and thus precautionary sav-
ing. In Table 2, we can see that as labor income becomes more volatile, the optimal allocation in
the risky asset increases and the precautionary saving demand decreases. The reason is that the
higher the value of σs, the less the calibrated value of ϑ, holding other factors fixed; consequently,
the effective coefficient of absolute risk aversion decreases, and thus the optimal share increases
and the precautionary saving demand decreases.
5. Extension: The Role of Intertemporal Substitution
5.1. Separation of Risk Aversion and Intertemporal Substitution
In the previous sections, we discussed how the interaction of risk aversion and informational fric-
tions affects strategic asset allocation and consumption-saving dynamics in the presence of unin-
surable labor income. However, given the time-separable utility setting, we cannot examine how
intertemporal substitution affects optimal consumption-saving and portfolio rules. In this section,
we consider a continuous-time recursive utility (RU) model with iso-elastic intertemporal sub-
stitution and exponential risk aversion.34 This recursive utility specification is proposed in Weil
(1993) in a discrete-time consumption-saving model. In our continuous-time setting, the Bellman
equation for the optimization problem can be written as:
J (ŝt)
1−1/ε = max
ct,αt
{
(1− exp (−δdt)) c1−1/εt + exp (−δdt) CE1−1/εt
}
, (56)
subject to
dŝt = (rŝt − ct + piαt) dt + σ̂dB∗t , (57)
where σ̂ ≡ f (κ) σ and f (κ) =
√
κ
κ−r > 1,
35 ε is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, δ is the
discount rate, γ is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion, and
CEt≡− 1
γ
ln (Et [exp (−γJ (ŝt+dt))])
denotes the certainty equivalent in terms of period-t consumption of the uncertain total utility in
the future periods. (Note that as κ goes to +∞, σ̂ = σ, ŝt = st, this model reduces to the FI-RE case
in which the consumer can observe the state perfectly.)
Furthermore, (56) can be reduced to
0 = max
ct,αt
{
δc1−1/εt − δ J˜ (ŝt) +
(
rŝt − ct + piαt − 12 Aγσ̂
2
)
J˜s (ŝt)
}
,
34For the recursive utlity with iso-elastic intertemporal substitution and power utility function, see Epstein and Zin
(1989) and Duffie and Epstein (1992).
35Here we use the same procedure as proposed in Section 4.1 to derive this perceived state transition equation.
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where J˜ (ŝt) = (Aŝt + A0)
1−1/ε, A and A0 are undetermined coefficients.36 (See Appendix 7.4 for
the derivation.)
5.2. Optimal Consumption-Portfolio Rules under MU and SU
To introduce robustness into the above recursive utility model, we follow the same procedure as
in the previous section and write the distorting model by adding an endogenous distortion υ (st)
to the law of motion of the state variable ŝt, (57):
dŝt = (rŝt − ct + piα) dt + σ̂
(
σ̂υ (ŝt) dt + dB˜t
)
,
where the drift adjustment υ (st) is chosen to minimize the sum of the expected continuation pay-
off, but adjusted to reflect the additional drift component in the above distortion equation, and an
entropy penalty:
0 = max
ct,αt
inf
υt
{
δc1−1/εt − δ J˜ (ŝt) +
(
rŝt − ct + piαt − 12 Aγσ̂
2
)
J˜ŝ (ŝt) + σ̂2υt J˜ŝ (ŝt) +
1
2ϑt
σ̂2υ2t
}
,
where J˜ (ŝt) = (Aŝt + A0)
1−1/ε and J˜ŝ (ŝt) = (1− 1/ε) A (Aŝt + A0)−1/ε. Following the standard
procedure, we can solve for optimal consumption and portfolio rules. The following proposition
summarizes the solution:
Proposition 9. Given ϑ and κ, the optimal consumption and portfolio rules under MU and SU can be
written as:
c∗t = [r + (δ− r) ε] ŝt +
[
1+
(
δ
r
− 1
)
ε
] (
pi2
2Aγσ2e
− piρyeσsσe
σ2e
)
− Γ, (58)
and
α∗ =
pi
Aγ˜ f (κ) σ2e
− ρyeσsσe
σ2e
, (59)
respectively, where the effective coefficient of absolute risk aversion γ˜ is defined as: γ˜ ≡ γ+ ϑ,
A =
[
r + (δ− r) ε
δε
]1/(1−ε)
, (60)
and the precautionary savings demand Γ is
Γ ≡ 1
2r
[r + (δ− r) ε] Aγ˜ f (κ)2
(
1− ρ2ye
)
σ2s . (61)
Proof. See Appendix 7.4.
When δ = r, A = r and this RU case is reduced to the benchmark model. The reason is
36Note that here we use the fact that
ln (Et [exp (−αJ (ŝt+dt))]) = −αAŝt − αA0 − αA (rŝt − ct + piαt) dt + 12α
2 A2σ̂2dt.
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that when the interest rate equals the discount rate, the effect of EIS on consumption growth and
saving disappears. When δ 6= r, A is increasing in ε. (We can see this from Figure 8.) It is also
clear from (58) and (61) that EIS affects both the MPC out of perceived permanent income and the
precautionary saving demand when δ 6= r. Specifically, both MPC and the precautionary saving
demand increases with ε when δ > r. When δ < r, MPC increases with ε, while the precautionary
saving demand decreases with ε. (See Figure 9.) From (59) and Figure 9, it is clear that ε reduces
the speculation demand invested in the risky asset by increasing the value of A. In summary, risk
version and intertemporal substitution shift the optimal allocation in the risky asset in the same
direction. However, their impacts on the precautionary saving demand depend on the values of
the interest rate and the discount rate.
From (59), we can establish the observational equivalence between an RB (ϑ) agent with a
Duffie-Epstein-Zin-Weil recursive utility with CARA γ and EIS ε and an FI agent with a Duffie-
Epstein-Zin-Weil recursive utility with CARA γ+ ϑ and EIS ε. This result is similar to that obtained
in Maenhout (2004) in which he links RB to stochastic differential utility proposed in Duffie and
Epstein (1992). To explore the quantitative effects of ε on asset allocation and precautionary saving,
we follow the same procedure to calibrate the values of ϑ using p. Table 3 reports these results for
p = 10% and κ = 0.5. For given values of κ, we can see from the table that the optimal share (α∗)
decreases with ε. Because the income hedging demand is independent of ε, the relative importance
of the income hedging demand to the speculation demand increases with ε. Furthermore, it is also
clear from the table that the precautionary saving demand increases with ε for different values of
κ.
6. Conclusion
This paper has developed a tractable continuous-time CARA-Gaussian framework to explore how
induced uncertainty due to informational frictions affects strategic consumption-portfolio rules,
precautionary savings, and consumption dynamics in the presence of uninsurable labor income.
Specifically, we explored the relative importance of the two types of induced uncertainty: (i) model
uncertainty due to robustness and (ii) state uncertainty due to limited information-processing ca-
pacity as well as risk aversion in determining strategic consumption-portfolio rules and precau-
tionary savings. In addition, we find that both MU and SU reduce the optimal share invested in
the risky asset. Finally, we find that MU measured by the interaction of fundamental uncertainty
and calibrated values of robustness not only affects the hedging demand for the risky asset, but
also affects the standard speculation demand.
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7. Appendix
7.1. Solving the MUModel
The Bellman equation associated with the optimization problem is
J (st) = sup
ct,αt
[
− 1
γ
exp (−γct) + exp (−δdt) J (st+dt)
]
,
subject to (10), where J (st) is the value function. The HJB equation for this problem is then
0 = sup
ct,αt
[
− 1
γ
exp (−γct)− δJ (st) +D J (st)
]
,
where D J (st) = Js (rst − ct + piαt) + 12 Jss
(
σ2etα
2
t + σ
2
s + 2ρyeσsσeαt
)
. Under RB, the HJB can be writ-
ten as
sup
ct,αt
inf
υt
[
− 1
γ
exp (−γct)− δJ (st) +D J (st) + υ (st) σ2 Js + 12ϑ (st)υ (st)
2 σ2
]
subject to the distorting equation, (10). Solving first for the infimization part of the problem yields
υ∗ (st) = −ϑ (st) Js.
Given that ϑ (st) > 0, the perturbation adds a negative drift term to the state transition equation
because Js > 0. Substituting for υ∗ in the robust HJB equation gives:
sup
ct,αt
[
− 1
γ
exp (−γct)− δJ (st) + (rst − ct + piαt) Js + 12σ
2 Jss − 12ϑ (st) σ
2 J2s
]
. (62)
Performing the indicated optimization yields the first-order conditions for ct and αt:
ct = − 1
γ
ln (Js) , (63)
αt =
pi Js + ρyeσsσe
(
Jss − ϑJ2s
)
(ϑJ2s − Jss) σ2e
. (64)
Substitute (63) and (64) back into (62) to arrive at the partial differential equation
0 = − Js
γ
− δJ +
(
rst +
1
γ
ln (Js) + piαt
)
Js +
1
2
(
Jss − ϑt J2s
)
σ2, (65)
where σ2 = σ2e α2t + σ
2
s + 2ρyeσsσeαt. Conjecture that the value function is of the form
J (st) = − 1
α1
exp (−α0 − α1st) ,
where α0 and α1 are constants to be determined. Using this conjecture, we obtain that Js =
exp (−α0 − α1st) > 0 and Jss = −α1 exp (−α0 − α1st) < 0. Further more, we guess that ϑ (st) =
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− ϑJ(st) =
α1ϑ
exp(−α0−α1st) > 0. (65) can thus be reduced to
−δ 1
α1
= − 1
γ
+
[
rst −
(
α0
γ
+
α1
γ
st
)
+
pi
(
pi − ρyeσsσeα1 (1+ ϑ)
)
(1+ ϑ) α1σ2e
]
− 1
2
α1 (1+ ϑ)
(
σ2e α
2
t + σ
2
s + 2ρyeσsσeαt
)
Collecting terms, the undetermined coefficients in the value function turn out to be
α1 = rγ, (66)
α0 =
δ
r
− 1+ pi
[
pi − ρyeσsσerγ (1+ ϑ)
]
(1+ ϑ) rσ2e
− 1
2
(1+ ϑ) rγ2
(
σ2e αt + σ
2
s + 2ρyeσsσeαt
)
, (67)
where α∗ = pi
(1+ϑ)γrσ2e
− ρyeσsσe
σ2e
. Substituting these back into the first-order condition (63) yields the
consumption function, (13), in the main text. Using (67) and σ2e α2t +σ
2
s + 2ρyeσsσeαt =
(
1− ρ2ye
)
σ2s +
pi2
(rγ˜)2σ2e
, we can obtain the expression for the precautionary savings premium, (15), in the main text.
7.2. Deriving Continuous-time IPC
The IPC,
ln
(
ρ21Σt + ρ
2
2
)− lnΣt+∆t = 2κ∆t,
can be rewritten as
ln
(
exp (2r∆t)Σt +
1− exp (2r∆t)
−2r∆t ∆tσ
2
)
− lnΣt+∆t = 2κ∆t,
which can be reduced to
Σt+∆t − Σt = [exp (2 (r− κ)∆t)− 1]Σt + exp (2 (r− κ)∆t)− exp (−2κ∆t)2r σ
2.
Dividing ∆t on both sides of this equation and letting ∆t → 0, we have the following updating
equation for Σt:
·
Σt = lim
∆t→0
Σt+∆t − Σt
∆t
= 2 (r− κ)Σt + σ2.
7.3. Solving the MU-SUModel
The Bellman equation associated with the optimization problem under SU is
J (ŝt) = sup
ct,αt
[
− 1
γ
exp (−γct) + exp (−δdt) J (ŝt+dt)
]
,
subject to (44), where J (ŝt) is the value function. The HJB equation for this problem can thus be
written as
0 = sup
ct,αt
[
− 1
γ
exp (−γct)− δJ (ŝt) +D J (st)
]
,
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where
D J (ŝt) = Jŝ (rŝt − ct + piαt) + 12 Jŝŝ f (κ)
2 (σ2e α2t + σ2s + 2ρyeσsσeαt) .
Here we use the facts that σ̂ ≡ f (κ) σ and σ =
√
σ2e α
2 + σ2s + 2ρyeσsσeα. Under MU and SU, the
HJB can be written as
sup
ct,αt
inf
υt
[
− 1
γ
exp (−γct)− δJ (ŝt) +D J (ŝt) + υ (ŝt) σ̂2 Jŝ + 12ϑ (st)υ (ŝt)
2 σ̂2
]
subject to the distorting equation, (44). Solving first for the infimization part of the problem yields:
υ∗ (ŝt) = −ϑ (ŝt) Jŝ. Given that ϑ (ŝt) > 0, the perturbation adds a negative drift term to the state
transition equation because Jŝ > 0. Substituting for υ∗ in the robust HJB equation gives:
sup
ct,αt
[
− 1
γ
exp (−γct)− δJ (ŝt) + (rŝt − ct + piαt) Jŝ + 12 σ̂
2 Jŝŝ − 12ϑ (ŝt) σ̂
2 J2ŝ
]
. (68)
Performing the indicated optimization yields the first-order conditions for ct and αt:
ct = − 1
γ
ln (Jŝ) , (69)
αt =
pi Jŝ/ f (κ) + ρyeσsσe
(
Jŝŝ − ϑJ2ŝ
)(
ϑJ2ŝ − Jŝŝ
)
σ2e
. (70)
Substitute (69) and (70) back into (68) to arrive at the partial differential equation
0 = − Jŝ
γ
− δJ +
(
rŝt +
1
γ
ln (Jŝ) + piαt
)
Jŝ +
1
2
f (κ)2
(
Jŝŝ − ϑt J2ŝ
)
σ2.
Conjecture that the value function is of the form
J (ŝt) = − 1
α1
exp (−α0 − α1ŝt) ,
where α0 and α1 are constants to be determined. Using this conjecture, we obtain Jŝ = exp (−α0 − α1ŝt) >
0 and Jŝŝ = −α1 exp (−α0 − α1ŝt) < 0. Furthermore, we guess that ϑ (ŝt) = − ϑJ(ŝt) =
α1ϑ
exp(−α0−α1 ŝt) >
0. Substituting these expressions into (65) yields:
−δ 1
α1
= − 1
γ
+
{
rŝt −
(
α0
γ
+
α1
γ
ŝt
)
+
pi
[
pi/ f (κ)− ρyeσsσeα1 (1+ ϑ)
]
(1+ ϑ) α1σ2e
}
− 1
2
f (κ)2 α1 (1+ ϑ)
(
σ2e α
2
t + σ
2
s + 2ρyeσsσeαt
)
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Collecting terms, the undetermined coefficients in the value function turn out to be
α1 = rγ, (71)
α0 =
δ− r
r
+
pi
[
pi/ f (κ)− ρyeσsσerα (1+ ϑ)
]
(1+ ϑ) rσ2e
− 1
2
r f (κ)2 (1+ ϑ) γ2
(
σ2e αt + σ
2
s + 2ρyeσsσeαt
)
.
(72)
Substituting (71) and (72) into (69), (70), and (??) yields the optimal portfolio and consumption rule,
(46) and (45), respectively, in the main text. Using (72) and that fact that σ2e α2t + σ
2
s + 2ρyeσsσeαt =(
1− ρ2ye
)
σ2s +
pi2
r2γ˜2 f (κ)2σ2e
, we can obtain Expression (47) in the main text.
Using (45) and (46), we have dc∗t = rdŝt and var (dc∗t ) = r2 f (κ)
2 σ2. The relative volatility of
consumption growth to income growth can thus be written as
µ ≡ sd (dc
∗
t )
sd (dyt)
= r f (κ)
√
1− ρ2ye
(r + ρ)2
+
pi2
γ˜2σ2e σ
2
y
.
The contemporaneous covariance between consumption growth and income growth is
cov (dc∗t , dyt) = r f (κ) cov
(
α∗σedBe,t +
1
r + ρ
σydBy,t, σydBy,t
)
= r f (κ)
(
1
r + ρ
σ2y + α
∗ρyeσeσy
)
,
which implies that
ρcy ≡ corr (dc∗t , dyt) = f (κ)
σs + α∗ρyeσe
σ
.
Substituting σ =
√(
1− ρ2ye
)
σ2s +
pi2
(rγ˜)2 f (κ)2σ2e
and α∗ = pi
rγ˜ f (κ)2σ2e
− ρyeσsσe
σ2e
into this expression leads
to (51) in the main text.
7.4. Solving the RUModel with MU and SU
We first guess that the value function is J (ŝt) = Aŝt + A0. At time t + dt, the value function is
J (ŝt+dt) = Aŝt+dt + A0 and dJ ≡ J (ŝt+dt)− J (ŝt) = Adŝt = A (rŝt − ct + piαt) dt + Aθdξt, and
Et [exp (−γJ (ŝt+dt))] = Et [exp (−γAŝt − γA0 − γA (rŝt − ct + piαt) dt− γAθdξt)]
= exp (−γAŝt − γA0) exp (−γA (rŝt − ct + piαt) dt) exp
(
1
2
γ2A2σ̂2dt
)
,
where σ̂ = f (κ) σ. We can therefore obtain:
ln (Et [exp (−αJ (ŝt+dt))]) = −αAŝt − αA0 − αA (rŝt − ct + piαt) dt + 12α
2A2σ̂2dt.
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Substituting this expression back into the Bellman equation yields:
J (ŝt)
1−1/ε = max
ct,αt
(1− exp (−δdt)) c1−1/εt + exp (−δdt)
[
J (ŝt) +
A (rŝt − ct + piαt) dt− 12αA2σ̂2dt
]1−1/ε ,
which can be reduced to
0 = max
ct,αt
{
δc1−1/εt − δ J˜ (ŝt) +
(
rŝt − ct + piαt − 12 Aγσ̂
2
)
J˜s (ŝt)
}
,
where J˜ (ŝt) = (Aŝt + A0)
1−1/ε and J˜ŝ (ŝt) = (1− 1/ε) A (Aŝt + A0)−1/ε.
In the presence of robustness, the HJB is
0 = max
ct,αt
inf
υt
{
δc1−1/εt − δ J˜ (ŝt) +
(
rŝt − ct + piαt − 12 Aγσ̂
2
)
J˜ŝ (ŝt) + σ̂2υt J˜ŝ (ŝt) +
1
2ϑt
σ̂2υ2t
}
.
Solving first for the infimization part of the problem yields υ∗t = −ϑt J˜ŝ. Here we also assume that
ϑt = −ϑA/ J˜ŝ to guarantee the homothecity of the RB problem. Substituting υ∗t back into the above
robust HJB equation yields
0 = max
ct,αt
{
δc1−1/εt − δ J˜ (ŝt) +
[
rŝt − ct + piαt − 12 A (γ+ ϑ) σ̂
2
]
J˜ŝ (ŝt)
}
.
The FOC with respect to ct is
δ (1− 1/ε) c−1/εt = J˜ŝ (ŝt) ,
which means that ct =
( A
δ
)−ε
(Aŝt + A0). The FOC for αt leads to:
α =
pi
Aθ (γ+ ϑ) σ2e
− ρyeσsσe
σ2e
.
Substituting these expressions back into the HJB yields:
0 = δ
[(
A
δ
)1−ε
− 1
]
(Aŝt + A0)+ (1− 1/ε) A
[(
r−
(
A
δ
)−ε
A
)
ŝt −
(
A
δ
)−ε
A0 + piα− 12 A
2 (γ+ ϑ) σ̂2
]
Collecting terms, the undetermined coefficients in the value function turn out to be
A =
[
r + (δ− r) ε
δε
]1/(1−ε)
and A0 =
A
r
[
piα− 1
2
A (γ+ ϑ) σ̂2
]
.
The consumption function is
ct = [r + (δ− r) ε] ŝt + 12
[
1+
(
δ
r
− 1
)
ε
]
Aθ (γ+ ϑ)
(
σ2e α
2 − σ2s
)
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where α = piAθ(γ+ϑ)σ2e −
ρyeσsσe
σ2e
. Substituting the expression for portfolio rule into the above con-
sumption function yields (58) in the main text.
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Figure 9. Robust Portfolio Rule and Precautionary Savings under RU
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Table 1. Implications of the correlation on α∗ and Γ under MU and SU (p = 10%, σs = 5)
ρye = 0 ρye = 0.18 ρye = 0.35
κ = 0.1 ϑ 1.455 1.475 1.536
α∗ 22.46 16.51 10.52
α∗s 22.46 22.28 21.74
α∗h 0 −5.77 −11.22∣∣α∗h∣∣ /α∗s 0 0.259 0.516
Γ 1.534 1.497 1.391
κ = 0.2 ϑ 1.418 1.437 1.495
α∗ 24.18 18.23 12.22
α∗s 24.18 23.99 23.44
α∗h 0 −5.77 −11.22∣∣α∗h∣∣ /α∗s 0 0.240 0.479
Γ 1.364 1. 31 1.216
κ = 0.5 ϑ 1.396 1.415 1.47
α∗ 25.21 19.24 13.23
α∗s 25.21 25.01 24.45
α∗h 0 −5.77 −11.22∣∣α∗h∣∣ /α∗s 0 0.231 0.459
Γ 1.279 1.217 1.129
κ = 1 ϑ 1.389 1.407 1.462
α∗ 25.54 19.58 13.57
α∗s 25.54 25.35 24.78
α∗h 0 −5.77 −11.22∣∣α∗h∣∣ /α∗s 0 0.228 0.453
Γ 1.253 1.188 1.102
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Table 2. Implications of income uncertainty on α∗ and Γ under MU and SU (p = 10%, ρye = 0.18)
σs = 4 σs = 5 σs = 6
κ = 0.1 ϑ 1.770 1.475 1.265
α∗ 15.29 16.51 17.42
α∗s 19.90 22.28 24.34
α∗h −4.62 −5.77 −6.92∣∣α∗h∣∣ /α∗s 0.232 0.259 0.284
Γ 1.675 1.497 1.370
κ = 0.2 ϑ 1.715 1.437 1.238
α∗ 16.92 18.23 19.21
α∗s 21.54 23.99 26.13
α∗h −4.62 −5.77 −6.92∣∣α∗h∣∣ /α∗s 0.214 0.240 0.265
Γ 1. 460 1. 310 1. 203
κ = 0.5 ϑ 1.682 1.415 1.222
α∗ 17.90 19.24 20.26
α∗s 22.52 25.01 27.18
α∗h −4.62 −5.77 −6. 92∣∣α∗h∣∣ /α∗s 0.205 0.231 0.255
Γ 1. 352 1.217 1.120
κ = 1 ϑ 1.671 1.407 1.216
α∗ 18.23 19.58 20.61
α∗s 22.84 25.35 27.54
α∗h −4.62 −5.77 −6.92∣∣α∗h∣∣ /α∗s 0.202 0.228 0.251
Γ 1.319 1.188 1.094
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Table 3. Implications of EIS on α∗ and Γ under MU and SU (p = 10%, ρye = 0.18, σs = 5)
ε = 0.1 ε = 0.5 ε = 0.9
κ = 0.1 ϑ 1.475 1.48 1.486
α∗ 16. 45 16. 19 15. 94
α∗s 22. 22 21. 96 21. 71
α∗h −5. 77 −5. 77 −5. 77∣∣α∗h∣∣ /α∗s 0.260 0.263 0.266
Γ 1. 538 1.856 1.881
κ = 0.2 ϑ 1.437 1.443 1.449
α∗ 18.16 17.87 17.61
α∗s 23.93 23.64 23.38
α∗h −5.77 −5.77 −5.77∣∣α∗h∣∣ /α∗s 0.241 0.244 0.247
Γ 1.346 1.629 1. 647
κ = 0.5 ϑ 1.415 1.423 1.428
α∗ 19.17 18.85 18.58
α∗s 24.94 24.62 24.35
α∗h −5.77 −5.77 −5.77∣∣α∗h∣∣ /α∗s 0.231 0.234 0.237
Γ 1.251 1.515 1.531
κ = 1 ϑ 1.408 1.414 1.42
α∗ 19.50 19.20 18.92
α∗s 25.27 24.96 24.69
α∗h −5.77 −5.77 −5.77∣∣α∗h∣∣ /α∗s 0.228 0.231 0.234
Γ 1.221 1.478 1.495
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